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Abstract
Multi-bi aid – donor contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for specific purposes – is an important 
channel for financing development, and is expected to grow. Yet multi-bi aid poses significant challenges for both 
multilateral and bilateral actors, including lack of alignment with recipient-country priorities, aid fragmentation, and 
increased transaction costs. This paper explores the potential for smart reforms of multi-bi aid. A five-step plan to 
improve multi-bi aid calls for better data-access and management; recovering the full economic cost of earmarking; 
fee structures for improving impact; stronger internal rules to curb fragmentation; and better country ownership and 
participation. These reforms can make multi-bi aid more effective and efficient while enhancing its legitimacy in the eyes 
of recipients.
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, ‘multi-bi aid’ has become a 
significant feature of the global aid architecture. This 
new type of foreign aid1 refers to donor contributions 
to multilateral organisations earmarked for specific 
development purposes, including regions, countries, 
themes, or sectors (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), 2011: 28). Following 
tremendous growth over the past 15 years, multi-bi 
aid reached a volume of US$27 billion in 2015, which 
represents about 15% of total aid (see section 2). For 
many multilateral agencies, especially the United Nations 
(UN), multi-bi aid has long outgrown core contributions 
and hence constitutes the primary funding channel for 
development. In 2015, the UN financed about 77% of its 
operational activities for development through earmarked 
contributions. Almost 90% of these earmarked resources 
supported individual projects rather than broad thematic 
priorities, implying that about 66% of all resources for 
development are strictly earmarked according to donor 
priorities (UN, 2016: 10). 
Earmarked multilateral finance is growing in popularity 
for several reasons. At one level, gaps and inadequacies 
in the multilateral system propel its use. Donors often 
deploy multi-bi aid to circumvent sluggish decision-making 
procedures. Multi-bi aid can therefore enable multilateral 
activity that is otherwise precluded due to institutional 
limitations and restrictive mandates (Weaver, 2008; 
Morrison, 2013; Eichenauer and Reinsberg, 2017). For 
example, trust funds allow the World Bank to engage in 
post-conflict spaces where its Articles of Agreement would 
otherwise not permit. 
Donors have also established multilateral funds to exert 
greater leverage over policy. For example, donors used the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria to 
redirect policy priorities at the World Health Organization 
(WHO) towards these three diseases (Sridhar and 
Woods, 2013). Perceived inefficiencies of the traditional 
multilaterals drove the creation of vertical global funds 
outside the established multilaterals (Isenman and 
Shakow, 2010: 12). For bilateral donors, trust funds may 
be convenient because they can count aid flows as fully 
disbursed even when these flows are not yet disbursing on 
specific activities (Eichenauer, 2017). 
Donors have idiosyncratic reasons for using multi-bi aid 
channels. Multi-bi aid can be especially helpful for smaller 
donors keen to expand their influence in areas where they 
have limited capacity (Michaelowa et al., 2016). Limited 
public support for foreign aid may also incentivise the 
use of multi-bi aid; its use can demonstrate control over 
aid spending while sharing financial burdens with other 
donors. Moreover, all donors have constituencies that care 
about specific recipients, sectors or themes, and multi-bi 
aid can satisfy these demands by increasing the visibility 
of multilateral giving. It may also offer an easy way to 
demonstrate accountability demanded by domestic audit 
institutions and national parliaments. 
Multi-bi aid has flourished in many cases because of 
policy entrepreneurs inside multilaterals (and bilateral 
donor administrations). Multi-bi aid empowers individual 
actors in aid bureaucracies, particularly operational units 
striving for budgetary power, autonomy and prestige 
(Dreher and Lang, 2016). The initiative to establish 
a trust fund rarely comes from agency leadership or 
bilateral donor governments. Instead, country units are 
usually instrumental, especially in the case of country-
specific funds (Reinsberg, 2017a). For operational staff, 
earmarking is not generally perceived as a problem 
because they obtain supplemental resources that are 
closely aligned with their ongoing activities (Jenks and 
Topping, 2016: 14). And yet the negative consequences of 
scattered activities can be felt disproportionately by upper 
management, who lack knowledge of initiatives and lose 
flexibility as a result.  
Ambitious donors can be expected to expand their use 
of multi-bi aid within like-minded coalitions (Eichenauer 
and Hug, 2015; Graham, 2015, 2016; Reinsberg, 2017b). 
Multi-bi aid however creates new challenges that relate 
to effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. Specific reforms 
could enhance its quality and impact. This paper provides 
an overview of key definitions relating to multi-bi aid, 
outlines the challenges it presents, and offers five proposals 
for its improvement in the future.
1 In this paper, ‘foreign aid’ refers to official development assistance (ODA).
2. What is multi-bi aid?
Multi-bi aid can be defined as donor contributions to 
multilateral organisations that are earmarked for specific 
development purposes. In contrast, multilateral aid 
refers to all unearmarked contributions to multilateral 
organisations, which includes membership fees and 
voluntary contributions. The distinctive feature of multi-
bi aid is that funding is pre-determined by the donor(s) 
to be used only for specific purposes, for example (sub-)
regions, countries, sectors, or themes (OECD, 2011: 28). 
Multi-bi aid is also known as ‘non-core resources’ as it is 
not pooled with other resources that are under the purview 
of the formal governing bodies (UN, 2012a). With bilateral 
aid, a donor transfers aid resources directly to an intended 
beneficiary without intermediating the funds through a 
multilateral organisation (Figure 1). By using multi-bi aid, 
bilateral donor countries can harness the implementing 
capacity and the specific expertise of multilateral agencies. 
2.1. Who provides multi-bi aid? 
Multi-bi aid originates from two sources (Figure 1). The 
first source is bilateral donors channelling earmarked 
contributions to trust funds hosted at traditional 
multilateral organisations. Bilateral donors are not unitary 
actors and as such, multi-bi aid allocations can be made 
from various government departments, which otherwise do 
not formulate development policy, for example ministries 
of education, energy, the environment, health, or labour.
A second source of multi-bi aid resources are ‘pass-
through multilaterals’ – legally independent multilateral 
institutions that operate in specific (sub-)sectors such as 
health, education, and the environment. Though their aid 
receipts from bilateral donors qualify as multilateral aid, 
their outflows are counted as multi-bi aid because they 
specify distinct (sub-)sectors for spending. Most pass-
through multilaterals exist as global funds and rely on 
Figure 1. Overview of ODA channels
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2 Multilateral agencies are not the only potential implementers of global-fund programmes, but the typical grant involves a partnership between a recipient 
government and a multilateral entity (with possible involvement of local non-government partners). 
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traditional multilaterals for implementing programmes at 
the country level.2 For example, the Global Fund to Fight 
Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria has become the WHO’s 
most important donor but only provides resources to 
address three global diseases (Sridhar and Woods, 2013). 
Accounting for pass-through multilaterals in the ODA 
statistics presents a considerable challenge (see Box 1).
Box 1. Tracing the flows of multi-bi aid in the multilateral system
Two possible treatments of pass-through multilaterals generate discrepancies in ODA statistics. From a bilateral 
donor perspective, contributions to pass-through multilaterals are unearmarked and therefore counted as 
multilateral aid. To avoid double counting, pass-through multilateral outflows must be dropped from the count, 
implying that multi-bi aid includes only formally earmarked contributions by donor countries. This conventional 
accounting approach underestimates the importance of multi-bi aid. According to OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) figures, multilateral aid amounted to US$41 billion in 2013, compared to US$18 billion in 
multi-bi aid (OECD, 2015: 2).
From a multilateral agency perspective, receipts from pass-through multilaterals are often tightly earmarked to 
particular projects (UN, 2016: 14). For this reason, classifying resource flows involving pass-through multilaterals 
as multilateral aid may be misleading. To improve multi-bi aid, it is essential to capture the full scope of multi-bi 
aid. 
Tracking the flows of multi-bi aid over the past two decades has become possible recently with new multi-bi 
aid data (Eichenauer and Reinsberg, 2017).3 This multi-bi aid dataset is based on the Creditor Reporting System 
(provided by the OECD/DAC) and tracks multi-bi aid activities of all donors. In addition, it includes information 
on the intensity of earmarking from the perspective of the receiving multilateral organisation (Eichenauer and 
Reinsberg, 2014). Offering a different way of accounting for multi-bi flows, this dataset results in higher estimates 
of multi-bi aid than OECD data; specifically, multi-bi aid was estimated to be US$27 billion in 2013 (Figure 2), 
compared to about US$19 billion according to OECD/DAC data.4
Figure 2: Evolution of multi-bi aid
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Notes: data from 1990 to 2012 from the multi-bi aid data (Eichenauer and Reinsberg, 2017), for subsequent years from OECD/DAC 
statistics,5 with accounting of pass-through multilaterals.
3 The data are freely available at http://www.ipz.uzh.ch/de/forschung/lehrstuehle/ep/research/internationaldevelopment/multi-bi-aid.html 
4 The sums of both figures in both perspectives should be equal but discrepancies are due to different base years of the deflated series. 
5 Available at stats.oecd.org (Accessed January 11, 2017)
2.2. Purposes of multi-bi aid
Multi-bi aid allows donors to specify their priority areas 
of development cooperation while harnessing the global 
expertise and implementing capacities of multilateral 
agencies. Recent research has made it possible to trace 
earmarking patterns from the perspective of multilateral 
agencies. Earmarking has at least two independent 
dimensions: geography and theme. For example, bilateral 
donors tightly earmark their contributions by country, 
restricting funds to a single country even when the 
receiving organisation has a global mandate (Eichenauer 
and Reinsberg, 2017). If earmarked for specific countries, 
multi-bi aid targets middle-income countries more often 
than traditional aid flows (Reinsberg et al., 2015). This is 
because in many organisations, core funding has become 
increasingly poverty-selective, leaving funding gaps in more 
middle-income countries that are being filled by earmarked 
finance. Furthermore, most activities can be earmarked 
thematically, restricting the use of funds to specific sectors 
such as post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian 
assistance. Double-earmarking – by country and theme – is 
also possible.
Donors also predominantly use Single-Donor Trust 
Funds (SDTFs, earmarked funds supported by only one 
donor) rather than Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs, 
earmarked (programmatic) funds supported by several 
donors). SDTFs accounted for more than 70% of multi-bi 
aid between 2006 and 2012 (Reinsberg et al., 2015: 540). 
While there are a few countries in which multi-bi aid is the 
primary aid channel, bilateral donors tend to give multi-bi 
aid to countries where they are already present bilaterally.6
2.3. The variety of multi-bi aid 
arrangements
Multi-bi aid arrangements are negotiated between the 
donor(s) and the multilateral trustee and laid down in an 
administrative agreement. Donor contributions based on 
such agreements are channelled into a ‘trust fund’. From 
a legal point of view, trust funds are financial instruments 
for development grants managed by a trustee, typically a 
multilateral organisation, with the requirement that these 
assets must be kept separate from core funds and follow 
specific reporting requirements tailored to donor needs 
(Droesse, 2011: 113). These trust funds are established 
under the institutional law of the host multilateral agency 
and thus are not independent of their host. This feature 
marks a key difference from pass-through multilaterals, 
which do have the ability to enter into legal contracts 
independently.  
Trust funds are extremely flexible devices that can 
accommodate a variety of governance arrangements 
and funding purposes. Different agencies use different 
governance models. At the World Bank, the simplest 
possible trust fund is a co-financing arrangement by which 
a donor provides additional resources to an existing 
project (if no project previously existed, this would be a 
free-standing fund).7 In contrast, programmatic funds first 
collect donor contributions and disburse the funds at a 
later stage according to predefined programmatic priorities. 
Programmatic funds are most commonly organised as 
MDTFs and provide more flexibility for multilaterals. 
They require a more complex governance structure, which 
includes a governing board that sets overall priorities, a 
Table 1. Multi-bi funding arrangements at different agencies 
Project-specific funding Programmatic funds / pooled funds
United Nations E.g. United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) project for 
Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending 
and Borrowing
• Thematic funds (e.g. UNDP Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust 
Fund)
• Country-specific funds (e.g. UNDP Law 
and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan)
• Global pooled funds (e.g. Peacebuilding 
Fund)
• Country-specific pooled funds (e.g. One 
UN Fund8 for Malawi)
World Bank • Co-financing (e.g. addressing gender-
based violence in South Kivu)
• Free-standing fund (e.g. Japan/WB 
Global Development Awards)
Country-specific funds (e.g. Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund)
Programmatic funds with several regional 
units as implementers (e.g. Forest Carbon 
Partnership Fund[s])
Source: IEG, 2011; UN, 2016; Jenks and Topping, 2016.
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6 According to OECD/DAC analysis, donors invest multi-bi aid in sectors that are different from their bilateral investments (OECD, 2015: 10).
7 This distinction makes sense only in the World Bank context, where typical projects are loans, not grants, and co-financing allows donors to support some 
elements of loan projects through trust-fund grants (Reinsberg, 2017a).
8 One UN Funds are specific multi-donor trust funds that receive strong support from recipient countries due to a consultative process throughout the 
programme cycle (OECD, 2015: 15).
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technical review committee that assesses the suitability of 
funding proposals, and a trust-fund secretariat to manage 
the day-to-day business and coordinate the stakeholders 
(Herrmann et al., 2014: 7). Trust funds can provide 
programme resources that support individual country and 
global thematic activities, as well as analytical work and 
technical assistance by multilateral agency staff themselves 
(Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 2011: 9). To cover 
overhead costs, or ‘non-programme resources’, the trustee 
deducts a management fee.
The UN distinguishes three types of multi-bi aid 
resources it receives. First, project-specific funds are 
most tightly earmarked and represent the lion’s share 
of earmarked resources. Second, single-agency pooled 
funds, which often support specific development themes. 
While managed by a single UN agency, these funds receive 
contributions from multiple donors. They are softly 
earmarked as the UN agency itself makes fund-allocation 
decisions to specific projects within the overall programme. 
Third, inter-agency pooled funds are multi-entity funds 
to support global priorities (for example peace-building) 
and country-specific programmes (for example the Central 
African Republic Transition Fund). Donors cannot 
earmark contributions to specific entities. It is often the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that 
administrates inter-agency pooled funds through its Multi-
Partner Trust Fund Office (Downs, 2011). In the standard 
arrangement, implementing agencies receive 7% to cover 
overhead costs and fund administrators retain a small 
fraction to cover the costs of secretariat services (Jenks and 
Topping, 2016).9
9 Examples include the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – a global humanitarian fund managed by a central secretariat – and country-specific 
Common Humanitarian Funds, in which the UN Humanitarian Coordinator makes final allocation decisions.
3. What are the problems 
with multi-bi aid?
Multi-bi aid has the potential to make important 
contributions to development, and has in many cases 
already expanded the resource base for global public 
goods, fragile states, and humanitarian assistance (IEG, 
2011). However, it has also given rise to a number of 
challenges, four of which are outlined below.
3.1. Transaction costs
Bilateral donors achieve flexibility from multi-bi channels 
at the expense of multilateral agencies. Transaction costs 
arise from the preparation, negotiation, implementation 
and enforcement of multi-bi agreements for the delivery 
of ODA (Lawson, 2009). For example, trust funds at the 
World Bank are funded by more than 220 donors including 
sovereign donors, multilateral donors, philanthropic 
foundations, companies and international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs) (Reinsberg, 2016). 
Some donors require special accountability provisions 
for contributions to ensure domestic compliance. These 
exigencies increase administrative burdens on agency staff 
and, coupled with the demands of fundraising, can dilute 
the focus of their work (The 1818 Society, 2012).   
The sheer number of trust funds implies a multiplication 
of decision-making venues that increases administrative 
costs while also straining the capacity of bilateral donors. 
Trust funds have also failed to deliver on their promise to 
reduce aid fragmentation for recipient countries (Barakat, 
2009: 108; Woods, 2005: 394; Barakat et al., 2012: 2). 
This is because donors do not tend to phase out their 
bilateral programmes when they participate in multi-donor 
trust funds (Barakat, 2009: 112). 
Trust funds are transaction-heavy over their entire 
lifetime. Upon creation, every trust fund requires 
negotiating an administrative agreement with the trustee, 
and bilateral donors need to coordinate policy priorities 
once funds are operational. While trust funds may appear 
convenient for bilateral aid officials who need to meet 
spending targets, money can sit in the fund and not get 
disbursed, as some suggest UK funds do in the World Bank 
(Mostrous and Kenber, 2016). This makes trust funds a 
rather expensive tool to scale up development aid because 
the World Bank deducts management fees on contributions 
(rather than disbursements).   
3.2. Policy incoherence
The explosion of donor-funded earmarking makes it 
difficult for agencies to formulate coherent development 
strategies around which to build donor support. 
Vested interests inside multilateral agencies carry the 
risk of making the entire organisation unmanageable. 
For example, as the World Bank management aims 
to standardise trust-fund procedures in order to curb 
fragmentation, operational units fret about a loss of 
flexibility.
The proliferation of multi-bi aid activities also poses 
challenges for bilateral donors. In most donor countries, 
multi-bi aid-allocation decisions are scattered across 
various departments and field offices, and governments 
often lack a comprehensive view of engagements with a 
single multilateral (OECD, 2015: 10). Even where such 
information is available, ensuring policy coherence is 
difficult because relationships are dispersed across diverse 
ministries. 
3.3. Harmful competition
Multi-bi aid spurs competition among different agencies 
(Reinsberg, 2016). While ‘mild competition’ may promote 
efficiency, harmful competition diverts attention from 
recipient-country needs and prevents system-wide 
coordination (Mahn, 2012; UN, 2012a; Tortora and 
Steensen, 2014). The UN system features considerable 
levels of competition for multi-bi funding. UN agencies 
compete most fiercely in the health and humanitarian 
sectors, as well as in the multi-agency UN Peacebuilding 
Fund and the UN Trust Fund (UN, 2012b: 50). According 
to a UN country survey,10 the main effects of competition 
are confusion for the government, increased workload, and 
diversion of UN staff attention (UN, 2012b: 50-55).  
Increased competition can also undermine the 
financial health of multilateral agencies. Having lowered 
management fees to attract new funding, some agencies 
12 ODI Report
10 The UN Secretariat conducted two surveys with UN field officials (UN, 2013) and recipient governments (UN, 2012b), with the aim of enhancing the 
development contribution of the UN on the ground.
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charge fees that are insufficient to cover programme 
support costs. This problem is particularly acute when 
earmarked resources outgrow core resources. As a result, 
several UN entities revised their fee structures upwards in 
2013, although an independent assessment concluded these 
rates were not consistently applied (UN, 2016: 19). 
3.4. Politicisation of multilateral 
institutions 
Multi-bi aid paves the way for undue influence by 
individual donors. At the World Bank, trust funds 
almost never require approval by the Board of Executive 
Directors, while at the UN, governing boards may simply 
‘take note’ of non-core programmes. A significant portion 
of operational activities of multilateral agencies thus lies 
beyond the control of governing bodies. This raises the 
question of legitimacy of multilateral governance – a 
critical issue especially for multilateral organisations 
meant to represent the neutral global interest. While 
donor influence is a well-known feature of multilateral 
governance (Dreher et al., 2009; Stone, 2011; Kilby, 2013), 
the sheer size of trust funds in overall programme budgets 
provides donors with unprecedented levels of control.
By distorting programme priorities toward donor-driven 
agendas and reinforcing sector priorities over country 
priorities, multi-bi aid may reduce the legitimacy of 
multilateral operations in the eyes of recipient countries. 
While recipient countries partake at least formally in 
multilateral governance of core resources, they lack 
influence over non-core resources beyond the purview of 
formal accountability processes. This is unfortunate as 
trust funds have always been intended to enhance country 
ownership and inclusive decision-making.
4. A five-step plan for 
smarter multi-bi aid 
In light of the challenges above, there are five areas 
where reforms to standing practices may improve 
the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of multi-bi 
channels.11 
1. Stakeholders should improve data quality, data 
management, and public access to data to promote 
smart allocation of multi-bi aid. 
2. Multilateral agencies should differentiate fees to recover 
the full economic cost of earmarking and provide 
incentives for bilateral donors to invest in the least 
administratively burdensome multi-bi aid mechanisms. 
They should also establish a contingency fund for 
programme support costs, and provide high visibility 
and results attribution for its donor contributions.
3. Agencies should develop fee structures that provide 
incentives for multilateral agency staff to improve the 
impact of multi-bi aid programmes. 
4. All stakeholders need to minimise portfolio 
fragmentation by developing specific administrative 
rules. 
5. Stakeholders should provide greater support for 
recipient countries to address country-specific priorities 
and ensure their meaningful participation. 
4.1. Strengthen data quality and data 
management
The paucity of data within bilateral donor agencies 
about the sources, size and purposes of multi-bi aid 
compromises the ability of multilateral institutions and 
bilateral donors to be strategic and internally coherent. The 
restricted overview of multilateral engagements implies 
that donors are unaware of inefficiencies in their current 
allocations, which undermines the principle of supporting 
only the most efficient multilateral channels. Donors need 
to increase their awareness of the importance of data 
transparency and enforce systems to centralise the flow 
of information on multilateral engagements (Tortora and 
Steensen, 2014: 32). Moreover, the incentive structures 
leading to an increased multilateral proliferation need to be 
understood better (Senior Level Donor Meeting (SLDM), 
2012: 5).
Lack of (access to) data prevents more definitive 
conclusions regarding system-level reforms. Better data 
hold the key to evaluating the differential effectiveness 
of multi-bi aid compared to traditional channels of aid, 
and provide guidance on more effective aid allocation. 
For example, the UN entities took a welcome first step 
by adopting a common standard on reporting on their 
funding flows (Jenks and Topping, 2016: 22). Moreover, 
individual agencies have taken steps to integrate budgets 
in order to increase transparency and promote long-term 
commitments (Jenks and Topping, 2016: 14). In the future, 
agencies should collate data at a much more detailed 
level. This means there should be data for all trust funds 
and all donors individually and disbursement data for all 
trust funds at project level. This would provide the basis 
for thorough analysis on the effectiveness of multi-bi aid 
and better-informed decision-making by aid donors. One 
obstacle to data-sharing may be the fear of losing resources 
if and when the data were to uncover relative performance 
gaps with respect to other agencies. Donors could address 
such fears by arguing that better information could boost 
overall commitments to the multilateral system and hence 
compensate for individual losses. 
Finally, bilateral donors need to meet regularly and 
share best practices on multi-bi aid through relevant policy 
coordination mechanisms, for example at the Multilateral 
Organisation Performance Assessment Network 
(MOPAN).12 In this context, donors should also commit 
the human resources necessary to improve their reporting 
on multi-bi aid. Data quality is essential for tracking multi-
bi aid in the development system. For the same reason, 
non-DAC ‘cooperation providers’ should be integrated into 
relevant coordination procedures.
14 ODI Report
11 These recommendations are most relevant for trust funds yet to be created. For existing trust funds – which hold previously committed flows of multi-bi 
aid – reforms will require changes to existing legal agreements and extensive bargaining among stakeholders.
12 MOPAN was launched in 2002 as a network of like-minded donor countries for monitoring the performance of mulitlateral development organisations 
at the country level. Through joint assessments of these organisations, network members identify strengths and areas for improvement in the multilateral 
organisations that form the basis for dialogue with these organisations.
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4.2. Recovering the full economic cost of 
earmarking
Earmarking can create high transaction costs that are not 
fully recovered by management fees. These costs often 
derive from unaccounted staff time, including maintaining 
donor relations, monitoring and oversight, and special 
reporting. Moreover, some types of earmarking are more 
burdensome than others; in contrast, co-financed funds do 
not create new governance structures and do not require 
additional reporting. Differentiated fees and the creation 
of a contingency fund are two ways for recovering the full 
costs of earmarking assumed by the multilateral host.   
When agencies differentiate fees according to 
administrative burdens, they can nudge donors into 
less burdensome arrangements. Differentiated fees 
adhere to the principle of fairness: bilateral donors with 
specific demands pay more than donors who accept 
the standard institutional arrangements of multilateral 
agencies. Although some donors may be willing to pay a 
high fee as they seek influence through specific types of 
trust funds, more cost-conscious donors will reconsider 
their earmarking strategy. Within the UN Secretariat, 
there are proposals to ensure that all strictly earmarked 
contributions recover full costs of handling multi-bi aid 
(UN, 2016: 19). For such a policy to be effective, however, 
all UN bodies will need to introduce it collectively to 
avoid undercutting each other. This may make further 
centralisation of fundraising within the UN system 
unavoidable (Wennubst and Mahn, 2013). 
Another way to recoup costs is to create a contingency 
fund devoted to financing the administrative burdens 
caused by other earmarked funds. For example, the Policy 
and Human Resource Development (PHRD) fund was 
created at the World Bank with support from the Japanese 
government to invest in solid project preparation and 
effective programme design. Creating a fund to cover 
administrative costs is, however, a difficult political sell, 
and the PHRD was phased out in 2012. Reluctance to 
support such a fund on the part of bilateral donors can 
be overcome by ensuring high visibility and attributing 
concrete results to donor contributions. Needless to say, 
contributions to a contingency fund would carry low 
administrative burdens and be fee-exempt.  
4.3. Fee structures for improving impact 
While differentiated fee schedules alter incentives of 
bilateral donors for burdening multilateral institutions, fee 
structures can steer earmarked funds to achieve positive 
impact. For example, fees can be based on the substantive 
contribution that a fund makes to the development goals of 
the agency. For example, the World Bank may place more 
value on trust funds that allow it to extend its assistance 
to issue areas that cannot be reached by core funding. The 
World Bank also levies different fees for different types 
of trust funds according to their financial risk. These are 
all strategies to encourage investment in the kinds of trust 
funds multilaterals believe will achieve desired outcomes.  
In order to ensure that trust-fund managers are 
incentivised to find suitable projects, fees should be 
based on disbursements. This is because fees based on 
contributions create incentives to raise funds rather than 
disburse them. Fees based on disbursements, however, 
create incentives to disburse previously received funds.13 
Deducting fees on disbursements rather than contributions 
would also mitigate concerns within donor publics about 
wasting resources through multilateral channels. To 
counteract pressures to disburse fund resources in order to 
generate fee income, fees should be payable only against 
clearly identifiable results. This would create incentives 
for trust-fund managers to insist on clear goals since 
they need to induce demand for the fund’s resources 
from implementing units. Managers would also have 
an incentive to improve quality in order to reach agreed 
results. 
Multilateral agencies could introduce a one-off set-up 
fee (for instance, currently US$35,000 at the World Bank 
in the standard agreement). A fixed set-up fee reduces 
the incentive for bilateral donors to create a new fund, 
which both minimises administrative burdens and, more 
importantly, raises the stakes for bilateral donors that 
are particularly vested in effective programme design. 
Higher set-up fees can also compensate multilaterals for 
postponing fee collection until disbursal has occurred.   
4.4. Minimise portfolio fragmentation
Experience shows that trust funds flourish when 
there is a lack of institutional rules to curb their rapid 
growth. Therefore, the creation of new funds and their 
management should follow clear rules that seek to 
minimise portfolio fragmentation rather than being left to 
the discretion of individual negotiators. Clear rules – for 
example regarding which types of donor demands are 
acceptable to an agency – would also prevent unwarranted 
donor influence. Such rules should inter alia cover the 
scope of earmarking possibilities, eligible expenditures, 
and reporting, audit, and evaluation (Herrmann et al., 
2014: 17). Both bilateral donor countries and multilateral 
agencies should institutionalise mechanisms to avoid 
duplicating existing efforts. 
Internal rules that have already helped reduce 
fragmentation at the World Bank include a minimum 
contribution threshold (currently at US$2 million), sunset 
13 Currently, fees in the UN system are levied on disbursements; the World Bank deduces fees on each contribution by a donor.
clauses to make trust funds expire after a predefined 
time, and standardised governance clauses. The World 
Bank has also managed to phase out dormant funds 
through intensified donor dialogue. For example, the 
Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program was phased out in 
2012 (financial year), facilitated also by changing political 
preferences in the Dutch government. Another example of 
phasing-out occurring was the Belgian Poverty Reduction 
Program. Both budgetary issues in Belgium and the desire 
of the World Bank to move away from SDTFs meant the 
end of the programme. Beyond these measures, donors 
should adopt rules requiring their officials to review the 
need for a new initiative (rather than joining an existing 
one) and the chosen form of multi-bi funding arrangement. 
Multilateral agencies should periodically consolidate 
programmes and require their staff to demonstrate support 
for new programmes from multiple donors to avoid the 
creation of new SDTFs.
Multilateral agencies need to consider the implications 
of those internal rules that are purportedly unrelated to 
earmarked funding but are indirectly consequential for its 
effectiveness. For example, recent analysis has shown that 
organisational reform proposals can unleash unwarranted 
multi-bi fundraising (Reinsberg, 2017a). In addition, 
staffing policies may be important. The success of multi-bi 
aid initiatives often hinges on the quality of the personal 
relationship between officers in the donor bureaucracy 
and the multilateral agency (Herrmann et al., 2014: 40). 
This makes quality control harder since good relationships 
are idiosyncratic and not amenable to systematic policy 
reforms. Furthermore, where programmes are successful, 
stakeholders must avoid relocations of staff members 
involved. In general, stakeholders on either side may need 
to reduce staff turnover and find ways to institutionalise 
relationships to avoid the perils of transition.
4.5. Enhancing country ownership and 
participation 
Due to its earmarked nature, multi-bi aid risks neglecting 
recipient-country ownership as bilateral donors privilege 
their own priorities. Sector-specific earmarking can 
neglect country issues and priorities, including the active 
participation of recipient countries in trust-fund design 
and oversight. It would be better if recipients had vested 
interests in the success of multi-bi aid initiatives, which 
could be promoted by increasing local contributions to 
these initiatives. Evidence from UN country surveys shows 
that multi-bi aid may need local conditions conducive to 
facilitating development impact. For example, the UN’s 
Delivering-as-One14 initiative created such conditions by 
removing pressures for fundraising and operating well-
staffed resident coordinator offices that facilitated the 
management of joint funding mechanisms (UN, 2012b: 
55).
Efforts to enhance country ownership and to build 
support for countries to participate in multi-bi aid 
initiatives are more successful when donors commit to 
use MDTFs rather than SDTFs. Multilateral agencies can 
help promote MDTFs by suggesting how donors might 
consolidate their activities, as well as ensuring more 
productive political relations between donors and host 
governments (Muchadenyika, 2016). Most donors are 
ready to increase their share of MDTFs, with UN officials 
in the field projecting a moderately higher availability of 
pooled funding from donors in the future. In addition, 
MDTFs allow bilateral donors to coordinate their multi-bi 
aid contributions to reinforce multilateral hubs of expertise 
at country level. They could accelerate the withdrawal of 
less efficient multilaterals from the multi-bi aid market and 
reduce duplication. Recent academic research suggests this 
may already be happening, as bilateral donors seem more 
willing to delegate aid multilaterally in country contexts 
where a multilateral agency has established a country office 
with a significant project portfolio (Michaelowa et al., 
2016).
All the above recommendations can help address the 
key challenges of multi-bi aid (Table 2). In the first place, 
stakeholders should improve data management internally 
by centralising the flow of information, and subsequently 
promote public access to detailed data to facilitate smart 
allocation of multi-bi aid. Moreover, stakeholders should 
seek to recover the full economic costs of earmarked funds, 
either by differentiating fees or establishing a contingency 
fund for programme support costs. Ensuring fee structures 
that support desired development outcomes is also critical. 
Furthermore, all stakeholders need to minimise portfolio 
fragmentation by developing specific administrative rules, 
including periodic donor portfolio reviews; phasing out 
dormant funds; minimum-size requirements; and sunset 
clauses. Finally, stakeholders should provide greater 
capacity-building support for recipient countries to ensure 
meaningful participation. Stakeholders should strengthen 
country-specific funds as a key institutional mechanism, 
and improve dialogue with governments to address 
country-specific priorities. 
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Table 2. Current challenges and proposals for reform 
Reform proposal Policy challenge Possible causes Detailed recommendations
Strengthen data 
quality and data 
management
• Fragmented multi-bi aid portfolios
• Lack of evidence-based allocation
• Lack of awareness and lack of 
managerial oversight 
• Reluctance to share data
• Vested interests in agencies
• Bilateral donors should centralise the 
flow of information and coordinate with 
others through MOPAN
• Agencies need to publicise detailed 
(harmonised) data to promote research 
on effectiveness
Recovering the 
full economic 
cost of 
earmarking
• Strict earmarking 
• Insufficient cost recovery
• Specific interests
• Accountability requirements
• Need for visibility by donor countries
• Differentiated fees to incentivise funds 
that are less earmarked and less 
burdensome
• Contingency fund for programme 
support costs (provided high visibility 
and results attribution)
Fee structures 
for improving 
impact
• Dormant funds
• High transaction costs
• Skewed incentives to raise new funds 
(rather than managing existing ones 
well)
• Fee modalities that combine set-up 
fees with proportional fees (deducted 
on actual disbursements and based on 
results)
Minimise 
portfolio 
fragmentation
• Fragmentation
• Undue donor demands
• Lack of rules and managerial oversight
• Organisational reforms pertaining to 
budgets and staffing
• Intensify donor dialogue
• Internal portfolio reviews 
• Reduction of staff turnover
• Institutionalise successful multi-bi aid 
partnerships
Enhance country 
ownership and 
participation
• Multi-bi aid programmes not priority for 
recipients
• Poor political relations with country 
governments
• Headquarter-driven focus on global 
themes and pressures for consolidation
• Maintain country-specific funds 
• Encourage co-financing (including 
recipients)
• Intensify donor dialogue with host 
government
5. Conclusion: a five-step 
plan for multi-bi aid 
Multi-bi aid is an established channel for bilateral donors 
to allocate their development assistance to the multilateral 
system, but it is not without its weaknesses. Careful 
thought needs to be given to the use of earmarking, as 
opposed to traditional conduits of (core) multilateral and 
bilateral aid (UN, 2012a; Tortora and Steensen, 2014; 
Gulrajani, 2016). The significance of multi-bi aid as a 
vehicle for channelling resources to multilateral institutions 
is growing. As a result, smart reforms are needed that 
harness the advantages of multi-bi aid without straining 
the capacities of receiving institutions and ultimate 
beneficiaries. 
This paper has advanced five proposals to improve 
multi-bi aid, which complement existing calls for more 
strategic use of aid delivery channels. Where donors 
provide earmarked funding, they should endeavour to offer 
more predictable financing, yield better results than core 
finance would, and ensure greater ownership by recipient 
countries, while also adopting organisational practices 
that allow for more effective and efficient use of multi-bi 
aid. Taken together, the proposed measures will help make 
multi-bi aid more effective. There could be no better time 
for stakeholders to act on such an agenda.
Certainly, implementing these reforms will face 
obstacles. And yet, these reforms may stand a higher 
chance of being implemented given that current proposals 
tend to ignore the political realities of most donor 
countries. For example, the current strategy pursued by 
the UN system urging donors to reduce earmarked aid and 
increase unearmarked aid is not enough. Unless bilateral 
donors are incentivised to reduce earmarking, they will 
not do so. Such incentives can be monetary – no fees for 
quasi-core funding for example – but they can also be non-
monetary, such as praising donors that help multilateral 
agencies maintain funding flexibility and showing 
taxpayers the achievements made possible through their 
funding. Communicating the true cost of earmarking to 
an interested public could also help build new support for 
better-quality funding of multilateral agencies – a joint 
effort in which both multilateral host and bilateral agencies 
must engage.
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availability of donor monies for specific sectors and lenient 
internal regulation, the analysis suggests organisational 
reform as the key driver of this trend. In particular, this 
reform undermined the budget autonomy of the sector 
units and hence caused these units to seek out new funds 
in their relevant areas of expertise. A number of reform 
features also reduced the administrative budget of the 
country units. This increased their demand for pass-on 
funding grants.
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The report reviews the different practices toward multi-bi 
aid on the donor side as well as the agency side. Based 
on the review of these practices, the paper arrives at 
four policy recommendations to make multi-bi aid more 
efficient. First, donors should base their use of earmarked 
funding on evidence and strategic considerations about 
when and why earmarked funding may be the most 
suitable option. Second, donors should provide guidance 
on the use of earmarked funding with a view to supporting 
good practices and enhancing internal coherence. Third, 
when extending earmarked funding, donors should 
carefully consider the implications of their requests and 
the conditions they set. Fourth, multilateral organisations 
should move to transparent and multi-year budget and 
strategy cycles that integrate all resources and allow 
transparent reporting and dialogue on results.
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